tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8726844009873922462.post1572085747322904968..comments2024-03-29T05:44:18.835-07:00Comments on Broadsword by Ajai Shukla - Strategy. Economics. Defence.: Interview: Mr KP Singh, Secretary Defence ProductionBroadswordhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13076780076240598482noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8726844009873922462.post-64753311558005174992008-01-01T09:12:00.000-08:002008-01-01T09:12:00.000-08:00Mr. Shukla it is unclear why a "cynical, teasing t...Mr. Shukla it is unclear why a "cynical, teasing tone" was used by you in this case --- and also when you said, "Tell us more about Pranab Mukerjee's opposition to the FGFA proposal plz".<BR/><BR/>If a defence procurement commission is formed, two prevalent practices can be erased. One is that single preferential bidding without tender flotation will be eliminated. An axample of this is the Scorpene, which was chosen singularly, the most probable reason for its selection being the bribery and commissioning facilitated by the French diplomacy in Delhi through arms middlemen and politicians. Another example of this is the Barak missile procurement.<BR/><BR/>The second advantage would be that political interference would be "nipped in the bud". Thus, the present case of Bofors not being declared the selected company due to reservations of the ruling party would no longer be there. Only the Army's preference would thus be 'paramount'.<BR/><BR/>It may be noted that a report by Rahul Bedi for CNN-IBN/Yahoo news was dedicated to the flaws in the T-90s tanks, such as overheating, thermal imaging, problems in laser ranging, firing inaccuracy and inappropriate shells, etc. Despite this, the T-90 had been procured in tranches since the past 8 years by the possible influence of bribery (as exposed by a 2001 Tehelka expose).<BR/><BR/>In this case, a vigilante body cannot allow the import of any hardware that either malfunctions, or does not meet the minimum qualitative specifications. Now, we trust that the Election Commission counts votes accurately (we may imagine if it were run by a govt. group of ministers or the like). Similarly, faulty equipment that does not meet standards can be rejected outright, whereas equipment which does, will be inducted IMMEDIATELY without delay, like new Bofors guns or light helicopters.<BR/><BR/>A vigilante body shall also have the advantage of functioning within a strategic framework and not on a requirement-tender basis. The long-term strategy would be to indigenize arms production. Eleventh hour requirements also can be avoided, like the hurried flotation of tenders and user-trials just at the time the Chetak choppers are about to retire; this time consuming procedure could have been initiated well in advance.<BR/><BR/>Mr. Antony's rejection of the Bell tender bid and the Spyder missile tender bid was morally justified;; however, the commission would not have allowed the situation of bribery and fraud to have arisen in the first place itself. Thus, the helicopter deal would have materialized by now.<BR/><BR/>However, the single most important task of the body would be to keep track of the development of crucial indigenous projects like the Tejas, Arjun and the ATV. The services have "shirked" responsibility by not co-operating with the producers to keep track of the projects at all. We may contrast this with Pakistan Air Force and Army, which was the manager of all projects of importance, like the JF-17 project, the Al-Khalid project respectively. In fact, HIT (their equivalent of DRDO) is managed by the Army only. This opinion was first given by Maj-Gen Ashok Mehta (retd) in an op-ed column in the Tribune.<BR/><BR/>The total lack of awareness and "aloofness" of the IAF during the Tejas' development, or the Army's lack of keeping track of the Arjun's life-cycle and evolution during the last 3 decades is also partially responsible for delays. The end-user changes QSRs mid-stream and this leads to delays. For example, the IAF's sudden requirement of re-designing the Tejas' wings in Jan 2004 led to delays of atleast a year. The Arjun has infact been "reborn" many times during the prolonged course of its development, as the Army kept demanding new "gizmos" that it witnessed at defence exhibitions. It is probably in its third generation today since it began life as a 105-mm tank, without any GPS, laser ranging and computers in the 1970s. Gen. Mehta has suggested in his article that a mechanism must exist to 'freeze' the QSRs with both the producers and the services agreeing to it. An independent body can facilitate and overlook this mechanism.<BR/><BR/>Recently, there was a news report about the "ego clashes" between the IAF and the ADA. <B>It may be astonishing to believe that an entire book has been dedicated to this very subject, titled, "The Tejas Story", authored by Air Marshal P Rajkumar (Retd)</B>. The relevant news report in the Indian Express stated that the IAF and DRDO have been at "loggerheads" since the project's commencement.<BR/><BR/>Thus, such a body would completely avoid such "ego clashes" and would be an effective mediator between the DRDO and the services. This body can also be in charge of promoting Indian hardware abroad; Dhruv, Brahmos, Su-30 MKI etc. can be canvassed by such a body at trade shows and exhibitions.<BR/><BR/>Thank you.<BR/><BR/>References :-<BR/><BR/>1) Report on T-90s by Rahul Bedi,<BR/>http://in.news.yahoo.com/061026/43/68rkq.html<BR/><BR/>2)LCA needs policy directive, by Maj-Gen Ashok Mehta (retd)<BR/>http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050608/edit.htm#4<BR/><BR/>3) The Tejas clash tells of ego clash between IAF, DRDO (Newindia Press)<BR/>http://in.news.yahoo.com/061026/43/68rkq.htmlAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8726844009873922462.post-51395277571249258612007-12-30T22:41:00.000-08:002007-12-30T22:41:00.000-08:00Okay, I intuitively agree with your suggestion tha...Okay, I intuitively agree with your suggestion that an independent agency might achieve better results... but let's do an intellectual exercise here, Abhiman.<BR/><BR/>Choose a piece of equipment --- light helicopter, 155 mm gun, whatever --- where the MoD process has been problematic. Then illustrate how an independent agency might have gone about it, and how it would have bypassed the problems that the MoD ran into.<BR/><BR/>Might be instructive for all of us!<BR/><BR/>thx,<BR/><BR/>ajaiAjai Shuklahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488839157370084666noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8726844009873922462.post-17077688313019195382007-12-29T07:12:00.000-08:002007-12-29T07:12:00.000-08:00Mr. Singh's may need to be reminded that the curre...Mr. Singh's may need to be reminded that the current procurement system has resulted in scams from Bofors to Scorpene, Barak and Spyder with regularity. If an independent vigilant body is tasked with meeting targets while maintaining an environment of transparency and fairness, the best equipment can be procured without scandals involving arms middlemen, politicians and underhand deals that are the norm today.<BR/><BR/>Regarding offsets, the US vendors atleast will choose only those Indian partners, whose capability does not exceed the US govt's list of classified technologies. In most cases (as reported in Economic Times), the foreign company in a JV with an Indian firm sets up the entire manufacturing line, while locally using labour, raw materials, assembly and testing only. This is the case of HBL's JV with Elta, Alpha's JV with Sofema and Kopyo, or HAL's JV with Boeing.<BR/><BR/>Sensitive technologies like AESA radar are unlikely to be given to India -- infact in this case the 6 contenders may unify into a cartel.<BR/><B>The funding and man-years spent into developing AESA radars is worth significantly more than the $10 bn MRCA contract and these companies would like to leverage its potential for many years to come, rather than "squander away" its technological secrets to a low-cost manufacturer like India.</B><BR/><BR/>Thank you.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com