by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 27th Dec 12
Although India now buys its defence
hardware from a range of countries in addition to Russia, the
Indo-Russian defence relationship remains stronger than ever. Instead of fighter aircraft, tanks and air defence guns,
Russia is now India’s prime source for “sub-strategic” systems that incorporate
closely guarded technologies. These include the nuclear-propelled submarine INS Chakra, which
Russia has provided on a 10-year lease; the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya; and
potential access to the precision code of Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System. After jointly developing the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile,
the two countries are joining hands to develop next-generation systems for both
their militaries, like the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft and the Multirole
Transport Aircraft. Russia has also helped India develop its own
nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine.
Although the defence relationship has
recently made headlines for negative reasons – cost escalations, time overruns
and serious glitches in technology transfer – it remains not just a positive
driver of Indo-Russian relations, but increasingly the primary one, along with
the other two strategic fields of space and nuclear co-operation. With trade
relations languishing, Moscow playing hardball with Indian hydrocarbon
companies, and the Sistema row roiling relations, the defence relationship is a
reliable sheet anchor that steadies the overall partnership.
Importantly, given the wariness that
characterises relations with China, any distancing from Russia would make India
appear uncomfortably like a western ally. With Russia growing politically
closer to China and increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy, strong
Moscow-Delhi defence ties give Russia the strength to keep China’s defence
industry at arm’s length. Moscow’s ambitious State Armament Programme aims at
practically re-equipping the entire Russian military by 2020 at a cost of $650
billion. This requires developing a whole menu of new-generation systems and
technologies, something that Moscow cannot fund on its own. The trust between
Moscow and New Delhi makes India the ideal partner for co-development, with the
cost and the technological risk shared by both of them rather than absorbed
purely by Russia. Furthermore, the vast requirements of the Indian military,
combined with Russia’s own modernisation drive, provide the economies of scale
needed for both militaries to obtain high-tech, low-cost systems.
Beijing’s institutionalised embrace of
reverse engineering means Russian technology czars prefer India, which buys
cutting-edge systems and customises a few key sub-systems to suit its own
requirements. While India benefits from Russia’s superior technology and
experience in building advanced weaponry, working with a senior partner could
create an undesirable dependency unless there are clear systems in place to
ensure that technology is absorbed by Indian engineers. New Delhi has also
realised that there are times when it has to accept delays and cost increases.
There are geopolitical and military advantages of a close relationship with
Russia, but New Delhi needs to deal with the disadvantages that are evident at
the transactional level and shape the relationship to both parties’ advantage.