Army warms up to indigenous Akash missile

Photos: the Akash missile on BMP-II and vehicle mountings. The newer version, being offered to the army, is mounted and fully integrated on T-72 tank chassis

by Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 7th Nov 09

DRDO Missile Complex, Hyderabad

India’s long-criticised Akash anti-aircraft missile is now blazing towards success. Its counterparts in the DRDO’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles, were on target from the start; the anti-tank Nag missile will also enter service shortly; the Trishul short-range anti-aircraft missile was abandoned unceremoniously. Now, after years of rejection from the military, the Akash is being accepted as a world-class missile.

The IAF’s order last year for two Akash squadrons --- dismissed by sceptics as a face-saving burial for the Akash programme --- has just been doubled with a fresh IAF order for 16 more launchers that will be stationed in northeast India. And now, Business Standard has accessed even better news for the Akash programme: the Indian Army is considering ordering several Akash squadrons for its ground forces.

The DRDO’s Chief Controller for R&D, Dr Prahlada, has confirmed that the army is displaying fresh interest in the Akash. Asked for details, Dr Prahlada told Business Standard, “I cannot say whether the army is interested in the Akash for its strike corps, or for another role. In any case, the Akash is a mobile system that is suitable for various roles.”

But protecting fast-moving tank columns from enemy fighters is what the Akash does best. For years the DRDO laboured to fit the entire Akash system --- including radars, missile launchers and command centres --- into T-72 tanks. This provided the Akash with the cross-country mobility to advance deep into enemy territory along with Indian Army strike corps, shooting down enemy fighters at ranges as far out as 25 kilometers.

Planned as a replacement for the army’s obsolescent Russian SAM-6 Kvadrat, the heart of an Akash missile battery is the Hyderabad-developed Rajendra phased-array radar that tracks up to 64 enemy fighter aircraft simultaneously, in a radius of 60 kilometers. The mobile command centre selects up to four of the most threatening air targets, and two Akash missiles are fired at each from the T-72 based Akash launchers, which move alongside. The Rajendra radar continuously guides the missiles, eventually “flying” them smack into the enemy fighters.

Theoretically, a “ripple” of two Akash missiles has a 99% chance of shooting down a modern fighter aircraft. Practically, however, in 9 live Akash trials so far, all 9 missiles that were fired hit their targets. Videos of the firing trials, witnessed by Business Standard, show the Akash missiles smashing their targets into tiny fragments at ranges beyond 20 kilometers.

The DRDO has taken 20 years to develop the cross-country mobile, tank-mounted version of the Akash missile system that the army is now interested in. Criticism of this delay has been vocal, but the DRDO counters by pointing to the quality of its product: the Akash, says the DRDO, is the only system of its kind available globally.

A top DRDO scientist at the missile complex in Hyderabad points out, “Western countries like France, which make missiles in the technological league of the Akash, don’t mount the entire system on a tank, something that the Indian Army insists on. Only the Russians build tank-mounted missile systems, but their missile technology is far inferior to that of the Akash. All that the Russians can offer today is the next generation of the Kvadrat.”

The defence PSU, Bharat Electronics Limited, is the nodal production agency for the Akash missile system, supported by a broad consortium of Indian public and private sector manufacturers who contribute components and sub-systems. Bharat Dynamics Limited manufactures the solid-fuel, two-stage, ramjet Akash missile itself.

Contracting with the MoD: stealing lollipops from babies

The Hawk assembly line in Bangalore. HAL claims that BAE Systems has failed to provide drawings, jigs, and parts according to the agreed schedule. BAE Systems denies the charge.

by Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 3rd Nov 09

If India’s military eventually plumps for primarily American equipment, a major reason will be: soldiers, sailors and airmen are completely sick of being gypped through poorly-framed acquisition contracts that entirely favour the foreign suppliers.

Take India’s contract with BAE Systems, UK, for 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), a billion dollar procurement that took 18 years to finalise. That contract, it now emerges, was framed so poorly that today --- with HAL Bangalore blaming BAE Systems for failing to properly transfer technology --- India’s Ministry of Defence can do nothing to twist BAE Systems’ tail.

The MoD now finds that the Hawk contract contains no provisions for liquidated damages in case BAE Systems defaults on its obligations. And, in an act of inexplicable generosity, India’s MoD paid BAE Systems an unprecedented “up-front” amount of 30% of the contract value; such a payment seldom, if ever, exceeds 15%. Now, with more jet trainers needed and the production line facing delays, fresh inquiries have gone out to global manufacturers, restarting procurement afresh.

Why do such fiascos routinely occur? Astonishingly, because India’s MoD does not have the legal experts needed for negotiating and framing complex defence contracts. The MoD’s forlorn Legal Cell, manned by 10-12 lawyers on deputation from the Ministry of Law, comes up during the framing of every defence contract against a battery of specialised contracting experts, an integral part of the establishment of every global arms vendor.

This year, the Indian MoD’s beleaguered and inadequate legal team will oversee capital expenditure of more than Rs 50,000 crores. When the MoD finalises its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), these less-than-legal-eagles will have to negotiate and frame a single contract worth Rs 50,000 crores. Supplementary contracts will be needed governing offsets worth half that value again.

Within the MoD, alarm bells have long been sounding. The Solicitor General and the Attorney General have been approached for help in accessing top-class legal advice. But, so far, there has been no response.

The complexity of a defence contract is virtually unparalleled. A “standard contract” is rarely feasible because the usage of each piece of equipment is radically different. Being an international contract, reaching agreement on arbitration is always difficult, especially considering confidentiality and non-disclosure arrangements. Defining “force majeure” is extremely important, especially when governments can invoke national interest during the execution of a contract. The MoD’s civil servants deal routinely with such issues, but without the benefit of solid legal advice.

India’s military has long suffered from flawed and inconsistent contracting, especially with Russian suppliers. Since the early 1980s, India’s strike corps --- the tank units that would spearhead a thrust into Pakistan during war --- have faced frustrating shortages of on-board fitment equipment that an ethical defence vendor would supply as a part of the contract. In an instance that generated much resentment, India’s first T-72 tanks were supplied by Russia without the tarpaulin covers that keep out dust and rain. When the military asked for tarpaulins, Russia demanded a supplementary contract, eventually supplying them at highly inflated prices.

In some contracts, especially those involving the supply of “strategically important” equipment, the vendor has the leverage to ignore his contractual obligations. Russia’s shakedown of India over the cost of the Gorshkov is an example of the limitations of any contract. Linking the Gorshkov sale with the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, Russia dismissed the initial price as “unreal, a mistake”, and demanded a renegotiated price. But, in most defence procurements, a good contract guarantees satisfactory supply as well as a healthy buyer-seller relationship.

US defence companies are confident that the experience of contracting with them --- with no hidden costs, superb product support, and a “partnership” approach towards the Indian users --- will make a big impact on the Indian military. So far, contracting with the US has been relatively smooth, but it is still too early to tell.

The MoD’s lack of capability in defence contracting is just one, especially worrisome, dimension of a broad systemic incompetence in procuring defence equipment. As a Group of Ministers in April 2000, numerous committees and, most recently, an excellent CAG report pointed out, the MoD has failed to put in place a functionally specialised acquisition organisation to handle a task that is clearly far beyond current capabilities.

But instead of a coherent system, procurement continues under 13 different agencies, each reporting to a different functional head. Contracts, after they are concluded, are managed by four different agencies with very little co-ordination among them.

Wen it’s time to talk…

Photo: courtesy Ajai Shukla

At a frozen waterfall, in Arunachal Pradesh last winter, near the Line of Actual Control with China

by Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 20th Oct 09

Indian policymakers have always been better at formulating strategy than at moving on after it has served its purpose. In so many of our engagements --- non-alignment, nuclear non-proliferation, trade talks and climate change, for example --- our intellectually and morally grounded positions have been policy rocks that withstood decades of pressure from competing interests. But, when changed times demanded changed strategies, Indian policymakers --- entranced perhaps by the beauty of their creations --- remained leaden-footed in responding to new realities.

Nobody would advocate a continually shifting policy framework, and the role of parliamentary resolutions in immobilising Indian policy is well understood. Despite that, New Delhi must wonder at its flat-footedness in seizing fleeting strategic opportunities.

One such opportunity will again arise on Friday, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh meets Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, at the ASEAN summit in Thailand. The meeting, requested by Chinese officials, will almost certainly focus on the escalating rhetoric between India and China and the need to cool tempers. Dr Manmohan Singh has two clear choices: on the one hand, he could repeat India’s oft-repeated position that Arunachal is an integral part of India; that the Dalai Lama is a religious head who is free to travel anywhere in India without engaging in political activity; and that peace and tranquillity should be maintained on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

That would constitute a missed opportunity. A more pro-active strategy would use this opportunity to persuade China to cooperate with India in defining the LAC.

The present undefined situation on the LAC contains the potential for an armed clash, something that would dramatically inflame current tensions. Despite the “Peace and Tranquillity Agreement” of 1993, and the “Confidence Building Measures” of 1996, patrols from both sides routinely “intrude” into each other’s territory in nine separate hotspots where India and China disagree about where the LAC lies. Since 1988, Indian officials in the Expert-Level Sub-Group of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG) have argued for clearly delineating the LAC. Only then would the potential for patrol clashes be eliminated.

For twelve years, Beijing resisted that Indian argument, believing that by leaving the LAC ambiguous, China would retain the potential for extending its holding later. Only in 2000 did China agree to a “sector-by-sector” exchange of maps, with each country marking its perception of the LAC. Negotiations were to follow to agree upon a common LAC, aimed at ending “patrol intrusions” by creating for both armies a line that they could not cross.

In the 8th JWG meeting, in late 2000, India and China exchanged maps of the relatively inconsequential central sector (on the Uttaranchal-Tibet border), marked with the respective perceptions of the LAC. But, even for the central sector, no “agreed LAC” has yet been negotiated. And China remains unwilling to exchange maps of the western sector (the Ladakh-Tibet border) or the eastern sector (the Arunachal-Tibet border).

Influencing China into delineating the LAC, important as it is, requires a major mental shift amongst Indian negotiators. Over decades, beginning with the 1962 conflict, skilful Chinese manipulation has induced the Pavlovian mindset amongst Indian interlocutors that raising issues forcefully with Beijing would invoke some form of diplomatic punishment. On the other hand, relatively anodyne statements and actions from New Delhi would ensure the relationship remained “on track”.

Consequently, until last year, China never faced “destabilising” political visits to Tawang, Indian troop increases in Arunachal, the refurbishment of border infrastructure, or even a modicum of political freedom to Tibetan refugees. This self-imposed Indian restraint has inhibited the timely resolution of problems; instead, issues fester until a breaking point is reached.

As New Delhi acts more vigorously to assimilate Arunachal, its diplomacy must acquire a matching assertiveness. Beijing must be frankly told --- not through the media, but face-to-face --- that raising the rhetoric will invoke a robust diplomatic response from New Delhi, not the back-pedalling that China is used to. And Beijing must be certain that an armed patrol clash, stemming perhaps from an undefined LAC, would greatly inflame Indian public opinion.

Such a shift in India’s engagement with China requires skilful diplomacy. National Security Advisor, Mr MK Narayanan, who is sufficiently preoccupied with internal security, cannot realistically continue as India’s special representative in the flagging political dialogue to resolve the border issue. Since 2005, this political initiative has only gone backwards; the recent discussions in New Delhi eulogised China’s “shared vision” with India and the “strategic and cooperative partnership”. But, for a dialogue mechanism set up to negotiate a breakthrough on the border dispute, little was said about the border.

Astra air-to-air missile to make its first flight

Photo 1: A front view of the Astra missile, which will make its maiden "captive trial" flight this month on a Su-30MKI

Photo 2: The current version of the Astra has a range of 44 km. This will be stepped up to 80 km in the Astra Mk II

Photo 3: The ground trial of the Astra in Sept 08, during which key flight and guidance parameters were validated

Ajai Shukla

DRDL, Hyderabad

Business Standard, 19th Oct 09

Veteran fighter pilots lament the end of the dogfight, the evocative name for a twisty, sky-ripping, adrenaline-packed aerial duel, in which the winner gets behind his opponent and shoots him down with a burst of cannon fire.

Today, it is less about flying skill, cold nerve and highly-responsive aircraft; the modern-day dogfighting ace is an airborne video-game expert who uses radar to detect his foe at long ranges, and launch a beyond visual range (BVR) missile even before his victim realises that the engagement has begun.

Just days from now, a Sukhoi-30MKI fighter will take off from an Indian Air Force (IAF) base, an Astra missile fitted on its wing. This will be the first-ever flight of this indigenously developed BVR missile, which the IAF hopes will add punch to its fleet of Sukhoi-30MKI, Mig-29, Mirage-2000 and Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) fighters.

The Astra, built by the Defence R&D Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad, will allow IAF pilots to hit enemy aircraft up to 44 km away, at altitudes up to 20,000 metres. Improving on that will be the Astra Mk II, with a longer range of 80 km.

The Astra incorporates many cutting-edge technologies. Here is how an Astra would take on an enemy fighter: an IAF fighter’s radar picks up the target; the pilot launches an Astra missile. A high-energy propellant quickly boosts the missile to several times the speed of sound. At ranges beyond 15 km, the Astra cannot “see” its target, so the IAF fighter guides the missile, relaying the target’s continually changing position over a secure radio link. Once it is 15 km from the target, the Astra’s onboard seeker picks up the target; after that the Astra homes in on its own.

At this point, the target would start turning and diving to throw off the missile. But the Astra manoeuvres better, and moves much faster, than even the most agile fighters. A radio proximity fuse measures the distance to the target. When the target is within 5 metres, the Astra’s radio proximity fuse detonates its warhead, sending a volley of shrapnel ripping through the enemy fighter.

Most of these technologies have already been proven. The propulsion system, the data link between the aircraft and the Astra, the radio proximity fuse, the onboard computer, the inertial navigation system and other key technologies were developed at the DRDO’s missile complex in Hyderabad.

The Astra’s seeker is still imported from Russia, but the DRDO hopes to develop one.

The forthcoming test with a Sukhoi-30MKI is called a “captive flight trial”; it will evaluate whether the Astra can withstand the physical stresses of supersonic flying and high-speed manoeuvring. Early in 2010, a “captive-II flight trial” will check whether the Astra’s avionics are properly matched with those of the Sukhoi-30MKI. The fighter should receive the missile’s signals; and the Astra should receive the aircraft’s commands.

“Matching an Indian missile with a Russian fighter’s avionics has turned out to be a complex task”, explains Mukesh Chand, one of the Astra’s key developers, “But the Astra will be much better integrated with the Indian Tejas LCA.”

Only in October 2010, after all the Astra’s systems are certified airworthy, will a live Astra be fired from a fighter. But the project scientists are confident; in a September 2008 test in Balasore, Orissa, a ground-launched Astra shot down an electronic target, validating many of the most complex technologies.

A drawback in the Astra remains its high weight; even a heavy fighter like the Sukhoi-30MKI cannot carry the missile on its wingtip stations. In comparison with the Astra’s estimated 150 kg, other BVR missiles like the Israeli Derby weigh around 100 kg only.

Nevertheless, the IAF believes the Astra will usefully supplement India’s inventory of BVR missiles. The Russian R-77 Adder, which arms India’s Russian aircraft fleet, faces worrying questions about its reliability. And the R530D missile, carried by the Mirage-2000, is nearing obsolescence.

Broadsword articles stirs up China: Agni-5 creates ripples

Photo: A graphic, taken from a Pakistani blog, highlighting China's range of missile options to an Agni-5 strike

An article by me, published in Business Standard and posted on Broadsword on 12th Oct, has been picked up by the Chinese media, apparently to highlight growing Indian offensive capability. People's Daily online says:

"India's Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) has made its forthcoming Agni-5 missile highly road-mobile, or easily transportable by road, which would bring Harbin, China's northernmost city within striking range if the Agni-5 is moved to northeast India.

The Agni-5 is similar to the Dongfeng-31A presented in China's National Day Military Parade in Beijing . India is going to test-fire the missile in early 2011.

The ASL, which develops India's long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles, enables the Agni-5 to reach targets far beyond its stated 5,000-km range by quickly moving closer to the target. Therefore, from various places across India, the Agni-5 can reach every continent except North and South America."

$11 billion MMRCA order set to become larger; Mirage-2000 upgrade negotiations stagger towards failure

Photo: A Rafale fighter; Dassault's chances in the MMRCA contest could be seriously damaged by a breakdown in the Mirage-2000 upgrade negotiations with India

by Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 16th Oct 09

New Delhi

The winner’s jackpot could soon become even bigger in what is already the world’s most lucrative fighter aircraft tender: India’s proposed purchase of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for an estimated Rs 51,000 crore ($11 billion).

The reason: a breakdown in India’s long-running negotiations with French aircraft manufacturer, Dassault Aviation, for upgrading 51 Indian Air Force Mirage-2000 fighters. According to senior IAF sources, Dassault has flatly refused to reduce its quote of Rs 10,000 crores (US $2.1 billion) for extending the service life of the IAF’s Mirage-2000 fleet by fitting new radars and avionics. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) considers this price --- Rs 196 crores (US $41 million) per aircraft --- unacceptably high, given that the airframes and engines will not be changed.

In comparison, each of the 126 brand-new, next-generation MMRCAs will cost some Rs 400 crores (US $87 million) per aircraft. That includes the cost of technology transfers, as well as capital costs for setting up a manufacturing line in India. Once those costs are amortised, additional MMRCAs would be significantly cheaper.

Dassault’s India head, Posina V Rao has not returned multiple phone calls from Business Standard. MoD sources say that Rao is engaged in last-ditch attempts to salvage the deal.

But, the MoD is veering around to the viewpoint that the Mirage-2000 fleet should continue service in its current form. After six squadrons (126 aircraft) of MMRCAs have entered IAF service, an additional two squadrons of MMRCAs would be built to replace the 51 Mirage-2000 fighters. That amounts to a 40% rise in the MMRCA’s numbers.

Israeli aerospace companies have reportedly entered the fray, offering to upgrade the Mirage-2000 for half the price being quoted by Dassault. The MoD, however, is not inclined to accept that offer.

Price negotiations for the Mirage-2000 upgrade have travelled a rocky road over the last two years. Initially, Dassault quoted Rs 13,500 crores (US $2.9 billion), which it brought down to the current level of Rs 10,000 crores (US $2.1 billion) after the IAF diluted its upgrade requirements. But the MoD believes Dassault’s reduced bid only reflects the diluted requirements, rather than any flexibility on the part of Dassault.

The IAF, traditionally a staunch supporter of Dassault and the Mirage-2000 fighter, is apparently changing its views. Dassault, say pilots, has badly damaged its credibility during the recent negotiations by arm-twisting the IAF over the supply of spares for the Mirage-2000 fleet.

The Gwalior-based IAF squadrons that currently fly the Mirage-2000 are Number 1 squadron (Tigers) and Number 7 squadron (Battle Axes).

Five of the six contenders for the MMRCA contract --- Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Eurofighter, Gripen and RAC MiG --- know they could reap handsome gains, through larger fighter orders, if India chooses not to upgrade the Mirage-2000. The sixth contender, Dassault Aviation, realises that failure to negotiate the Mirage-2000 upgrade contract could seriously damage the chances of its Rafale fighter in the MMRCA contract.

The fighters in contention for the MMRCA contract are sequentially undergoing flight trials and evaluation, which the IAF expects to complete by April 2010. It will take another six months to finalise the trial report and submit that to India’s MoD. The MoD will then announce the winner of the contract.

Agni-5: multiple warheads, road-mobility, global reach

Photo 1: China's Dongfeng-31 missile, a canisterised ICBM operated by the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. The canisterised Agni-5 will be somewhat smaller than this

Photo 2: The target end of a US MIRV test in the Marshall Islands. Clearly visible are the tracks of 8 separate warheads

Ajai Shukla

Business Standard

Hyderabad 12th Oct 09

The Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) in Hyderabad, which develops India’s strategic (long-range, nuclear-tipped) missiles, has dramatically increased the options for its forthcoming Agni-5 missile by making it highly road-mobile, or easily transportable by road.

That enables the Agni-5 to reach targets far beyond its stated 5,000-km range by quickly moving closer to the target. In a hypothetical war against, say, Sweden, an Agni-5 launcher, stationed near Bangalore, would be unable to strike Stockholm, 7,000 km away. But moving by road to Amritsar would bring Stockholm within range.

Similarly, moving the Agni-5 to northeast India would bring even Harbin, China’s northernmost city, within striking range. From various places across India, the Agni-5 can reach every continent except North and South America.

The Agni-5 will be the first canisterised, road-mobile missile in India’s arsenal, similar to the Dongfeng-31A that created ripples during China’s National Day Military Parade in Beijing on October 1. India’s current long-range missile, the Agni-3, a non-canisterised missile, can only be moved with difficulty from one place to another.

In many other respects, the Agni-5, which is scheduled to make its first flight in early-2011, carries forward the Agni-3 pedigree. With composites used extensively to reduce weight, and a third stage added on (the Agni-3 was a two-stage missile), the Agni-5 can fly 1,500 km further than the 3,500-km Agni-3.

“The Agni-5 is specially tailored for road-mobility,” explains Avinash Chander, Director, ASL. “With the canister having been successfully developed, all India’s future land-based strategic missiles will be canisterised as well”.

Made of maraging steel, a canister must provide a hermitically sealed atmosphere that preserves the missile for years. During firing, the canister must absorb enormous stresses when a thrust of 300to 400 tonnes is generated to eject the 50-tonne missile.

Canister technology was first developed in India for the Brahmos cruise missile. But it was the K-15 underwater-launched missile, developed here in Hyderabad for India’s nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant, which fully overcame the technological hurdles in canisterising ballistic missiles.

Another major technological breakthrough that will beef up the Agni-5 is ASL’s success in developing and testing MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). An MIRV, atop an Agni-5 missile, comprises three to 10 separate nuclear warheads. Each warhead can be assigned to a separate target, separated by hundreds of kilometres; alternatively, two or more warheads can be assigned to one target.

“We have made major progress on the MIRVs in the last two years,” is all that Avinash Chander is willing to say on the subject.

Nevertheless, extensive testing still lies ahead for this highly complex technology. MIRVs will be deployed on the Agni-5 only after another 4-5 years.

While MIRV technology is similar to launching multiple satellites through a space rocket, a missile requires far greater accuracy. A satellite would be considered in correct orbit even it is a kilometre higher or lower than planned.

But each warhead in an MIRV must impact within 40 metres of its target. With such high accuracies, even small nuclear warheads are sufficient for the job.

Strategic planners consider MIRVs essential, given India’s declared “no first use” nuclear policy. Even after an enemy has hit India with a full-fledged nuclear strike, destroying or incapacitating much of the strategic arsenal, a handful of surviving Indian missiles must be capable of retaliating with massive and unacceptable damage. Multiple warheads on a handful of Agni-5 missiles would constitute such a capability.

MIRVs also enable a single missile to overwhelm the enemy’s missile defences. Tracking and shooting down multiple warheads are far more difficult than intercepting a single warhead.

Providing each warhead with the capability to manoeuvre, and dodge enemy interceptor missiles, increases survivability further. The MIRV warheads are also being given electronic packages for jamming enemy radars.