How did the DRDO's missile programme succeed, while its other programmes struggled?
by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 21st Sept 13
Observers
of India’s struggle to design and build defence equipment might wonder why the
indigenous missile programme has been so much more successful than many other
projects that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has
taken up. Even as the ballistic missile programme struck another bulls-eye on
Sept 15 with the successful second test of the Agni-5 intermediate range
ballistic missile (IRBM), the DRDO’s other flagship projects --- the Arjun
tank, the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and an airborne early warning (AEW)
system --- make much more laboured progress.
What began
as the modest Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) in 1983, has
delivered to the military a range of missiles, both strategic and tactical. The
ballistic missiles includes the Prithvi (350 kilometres range); its naval
version, Dhanush; the underwater-launched ballistic missiles, and the Agni
series with ranges between 1,000-5,000 kilometres. The latest arrow in this
quiver, the Agni-5, will enter operational service as a canisterised,
road-mobile missile that can deliver
nuclear warheads to targets across South, South East, Central and West Asia,
China, most of Europe and large parts of Africa.
Simultaneously,
development has begun of the Agni-5’s successor, the Agni-6. This intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of over 6,000 kilometres will carry a
massive three-tonne payload (current Agni payloads weigh one tonne). This will consist
of several multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), each
one capable of being aimed at a different target. Each warhead --- termed
maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) --- will perform evasive maneuvers as it
hurtles down towards its target, making it difficult for enemy air defence systems
to shoot it down.
India has
pointedly steered clear of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, which are smaller bombs
delivered by shorter-range missiles. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent relies on a
TNW --- called the Nasr, or the Hatf-9, with a maximum range of 60 kilometres
--- to counter India’s Cold Start Doctrine. This allows India to retaliate to
major Pakistani provocations, like a terrorist strike or a political
assassination, with punitive strikes deep into Pakistan by armoured battle
groups. Pakistan hopes to deter such strikes with the threat of small TNWs.
India, like China, believes that TNWs are inherently dangerous. Since they are
short range battlefield weapons, they are vulnerable to theft by terrorists, or
to being launched by renegade military commanders. India’s nuclear deterrent,
therefore, consists of longer-range weapons that target enemy cities (i.e.
counter value targeting), not military formations (counter force targeting).
Even while
eschewing TNWs, India’s ballistic missile programme has spun off a range of
subsidiary missiles. These include the Shaurya, a hybrid missile that has both
ballistic and cruise missile profiles, and which is a twin of the indigenous submarine-launched
K-15 nuclear-tipped missile; the Prahar, which has a programmable path; and the
Nirbhay cruise missile that has just entered testing. There is also an
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) programme, which features two types of interceptor
missiles destroying incoming enemy ballistic missiles before they can do any
damage --- an exo-atmospheric interceptor, which intercepts enemy missiles at
altitudes up to 150 kilometres; and an endo-atmospheric interceptor that
intercepts at 30 kilometres and below.
Finally,
there is the Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM), which can detect and quickly
shoot down enemy aircraft at ranges of 30 kilometres; the fire-and-forget Nag
missile, which destroys tanks at ranges of 4 kilometres; and the air-to-air
Astra missile, which can shoot down modern fighters at ranges of 44 kilometres.
This is being developed into an Astra II, which can strike enemy fighters up to
80 kilometres away.
* * * *
A long road
This
success has not come easy. Top DRDO officials, such as the previous chief, Dr
VK Saraswat, say that the foundation of the missile development programme’s success
was laid in 1982, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the crucial decision
that India must develop and build missile systems within the country.
Well before
that, in the 1960s and 1970s, DRDO laboratories like the Hyderabad-based Defence
R&D Laboratory (DRDL) had explored the development of anti-tank missiles
and sounding rockets. After the Pakistan Army’s US-supplied “Cobra” missiles
took a heavy toll of Indian tanks in the 1965 war, the army extended support to
DRDL for developing a missile. Over the next five years, anti-tank missile
prototypes built by the fledgling laboratory were flight tested by the army.
But, not for the last time, the army decided to abandon the indigenous option
and, instead, import the French SS11B1 missile “to meet an urgent threat.”
Simultaneously,
in 1969, the Indian Air Force (IAF) initiated a project to reverse engineer the
Soviet Union’s SA-75 surface to air missile (SAM), because Moscow was not
supplying spares in adequate quantities. This venture, called “Project Devil”,
never came to production, but allowed the DRDL to build the experience and
knowhow that eventually gave birth to the Akash missile.
In April
1982, a Missile Study Team (MST) was formed under the chairmanship of the
DRDO’s upcoming hard-driving young star, APJ Abdul Kalam, who was appointed
Director, DRDL. Under Kalam, the MST analysed the country’s missile requirements
in a succession of plenary meetings the military and the ministry.
Finally, at
a fateful meeting in a South Block conference room in New Delhi in autumn 1982,
Kalam presented his findings to the defence minister at that time, Mr R
Venkataraman (both went on to become President of India). Also present were the
three service chiefs, the cabinet secretary, principal secretary to Indira
Gandhi, and the DRDO chief, Dr VS Arunachalam. Kalam recommended the phased
development of five missiles --- the Trishul and Akash surface-to-air missiles;
the Nag anti-tank missile; the Prithvi short range ballistic missile; and an
Agni technology demonstrator to validate re-entry technology.
If Kalam
was a hard-driving visionary, so too was Venkataraman. Dismissing all talk of a
“phased programme”, he ordered all programmes to be taken up simultaneously. With
the imprimatur of the prime minister on the project, the Integrated Guided
Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was formally sanctioned in July 1983, and
funds were pre-allocated for a 12-year period up to 1995. Its executive head
was Kalam, with the title of Chairman, Programme Management Board (PMB).
* * * *
The men behind the machine
Those were
heady days for the DRDO’s idealistic young scientists, buoyed by the 1971
victory over Pakistan and the “peaceful nuclear experiment” of 1974.
In 1972,
two young IIT graduates, VK Saraswat and Avinash Chander joined the DRDO just
ten days apart. They were amongst more than a hundred young scientists who
joined the DRDO’s missile complex after graduating from premier institutions
like the IITs, and Jadhavpur University. Within three years, Saraswat was
heading propulsion development; while Chander spearheaded the development of
navigation and guidance systems.
“Our
success in missiles was due to three factors. Firstly, this batch of young
scientists came with a work culture, thought processes and confidence that they
could do almost anything. They built everything from scratch,” says Chander.
“Secondly, Dr
Kalam unleashed thought processes and the freedom to function, reinforcing
creativity with excellent review mechanisms. Thirdly, Kalam created an
eco-system where DRDO laboratories worked together in clusters. Research and Development
(Engineers), Pune developed launchers, Defence Electronics Research Laboratory
(DLRL) developed radars, Armament R&D Establishment (ARDE) built the
warheads --- people across the country worked for the IGMDP.
The DRDO’s
internal records show that the IGMDP started in 1983 with eight laboratories,
but then quickly expanded to involve 24 DRDO labs. Even today, the missile
cluster consists of just four laboratories --- the venerable DRDL, the Advanced
Systems Laboratory (ASL), and Research Centre, Imarat (RCI) at Hyderabad; and
the Interim Test Range and Chandipur, off the Orissa coast. But, in fact a host
of DRDO laboratories across India support missile programmes.
And as
programmes become more complex, oversight is increasing. From early September,
the missile cluster, as well as the DRDO’s other six technology clusters, began
functioning under a “director general”, who will have executive powers for the
various missile programmes being pursued by his laboratories.
* * * *
Sanctions and self-reliance
Most senior
DRDO scientists, including the last two chiefs, are emphatic that the rigid
technology denials that the IGMDP faced were critical in catalysing success.
Dr VS
Arunachalam, who headed the DRDO when the IGMDP was set up, wrote: “What
remains in my mind after so many years… (is) enormous pride in our building the
necessary critical technologies, in the midst of embargoes and denials; and
these projects were not easy and these roads were less travelled and painfully
hard. Global meetings between scientists were forbidden (to Indian scientists),
commercial and committed orders were cancelled and professors from our
academies were denied visas to attend scientific conferences and political pressures
were applied to cancel the projects and programmes.”
Rahul
Chaudhary, CEO of Tata Power SED and an astute observer of the Indian defence
industry, points out: “Wherever we have worked without the option of import ---
be it on strategic missiles, nuclear weapons, atomic energy or the space
programme --- we have achieved self-reliance. In the super-secret world of
electronic warfare, where import is not an option, we have built world-class
systems. We should ourselves ban imports, and we will indigenise. Necessity is
the mother of invention.”
Instead of
banning imports, the DRDO is opening up to the world. Today, a technologically confident
DRDO missile complex is co-developing tactical missile systems with overseas
partners. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) bans the sale or supply
of missiles and unmanned aircraft with ranges of more than 300 kilometres, but permits
this for systems with lower ranges. India has set up the Brahmos joint venture
with Russia to build a supersonic cruise missile (with a range of 295
kilometres!); the DRDO is cooperating with Israel Aerospace Industries to build
two surface-to-air missiles; and Washington has offered to co-develop the
next-generation version of the Javelin anti-tank missile with India. Whether
this equips the DRDO with more advanced capabilities across the board, or
confines it to narrow domains where it has already developed expertise, remains
to be seen.
Writes Dr
Arunachalam: “The global environment has now changed. Countries are now coming
forward offering cooperation in many areas of technology. They talk of sharing
advanced technologies and joint ventures. While welcoming them we should not
abandon our commitment to be independent in critical technologies.”