Tuesday, 28 May 2013

Tracking Afghanistan's 900-pound guerrilla


Former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, autographs his book. A must-read for Afghanistan-watchers

by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 28th May 13

“The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core Al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves Al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States,” declared US President Barack Obama on Thursday at the National Defence University, Washington DC. He was announcing the effective end of America’s global war on terror; a sharp curtailment of the drone strike programme; and confirming that most American troops would pull out from Afghanistan by end-2014.

This is mixed news for India. For a dozen years since 9/11, the US military has secured the Afghan playground, providing the tenuous security in which India’s $2 billion aid programme has enhanced our already friendly image. But the US military presence has also backstopped Hamid Karzai’s artificial, centralized regime --- an alien political construct in inherently federal Afghanistan. And America’s presence has been the oxygen that sustained the Taliban insurgency.

The Taliban will not be the only winners from the US drawdown, as a range of Afghan regional leaders would reassert control over their traditional support bases. Panjsheri leaders, Ismael Khan in Herat, Rashid Dostum in Uzbek areas, and Mohaqiq and Khalili in the Hazarajat will all reclaim the influence that US power and money forced them to cede to Hamid Karzai in Kabul. So too will the canny Hizb-e-Islami chieftain, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is waging an underground armed struggle; while simultaneously fielding candidates in legitimate elections to parliament.

Heading the list of losers will be Hamid Karzai, or his successor in the presidential palace in Kabul (In New Delhi last week, Karzai had declared, “no circumstance will allow me to stay as president”). With fewer foreign troops, curtailed funding and a military that serious reverses could fracture along ethnic fault lines, Kabul’s writ could be confined to a dramatically reduced geography. Since the next government in Kabul will be just one of the pack, rather than the ultimate arbiter of power that it has been since 2001, New Delhi was wise last week in treating cautiously Karzai’s “wish list” for Indian weaponry.

Dealing equitably with Afghanistan’s disparate power players while continuing to support the ebbing power in Kabul would position New Delhi for brokering a suitable peace settlement in Afghanistan. Given the war fatigue in that country and the trust that India enjoys there, New Delhi is well poised to play Honest Joe. For that, New Delhi must consciously demonstrate even-handedness. It can no longer arm Kabul, or any Afghan group, to the exclusion of the others.

India can only broker peace in post-2014 Afghanistan if it has dialogue linkages with every major faction. Since the anti-Soviet jihad ended in 1989, India has developed strong relations and functional partnerships with a cross-section of Afghan groups. But three major groups still remain beyond New Delhi’s influence --- the Taliban’s Quetta Shoora (or Rehbari Shoora), led by Mullah Omar; the Hizb-e-Islami; and the Haqqani Network. While the Hizb-e-Islami’s immensely pragmatic (and widely reviled) chief, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, would respond to New Delhi’s blandishments, the Haqqani Network --- funded, organised and controlled by the Pakistan Army --- would emphatically reject dialogue with Indian interlocutors. That leaves the 900-pound guerrilla of the southern Pashtun heartland, Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shoora, which India has long ignored because of a mixture of short-sightedness, unimaginativeness, incompetence, prejudice and fear.

Even as evidence piles up of the Quetta Shoora’s disillusionment with Pakistan and its heavy-handed, unsophisticated spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), New Delhi incredibly refuses to accept, or act on, its good fortune. Despite indications of friction between an exploitative Islamabad and a rebellious Taliban leadership for whom Afghan interests take precedence over Pakistan’s, New Delhi clings onto a monochromatic worldview in which the fundamentalist Taliban is the Evil Empire. South Block does not perceive that the Taliban has to align with the pro-India (and anti-Pakistan) sentiment of the Afghan people. Instead New Delhi keeps trotting out the historically unjustifiable bugaboo that, having sent off the Americans, the Taliban would then divert its attention to Kashmir A top Indian government official even says: “If Mullah Omar is serious about repairing relations with India, let him first prove it!”

While New Delhi waits for its windfall to validate itself, Pakistan has understood what India has not --- that influence rests on contacts and relationships across the power spectrum. Expecting to shape the outcome in Afghanistan, Pakistan is building bridges with traditional Indian friends there, especially members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance, and with Hamid Karzai who is happy to take out insurance with his powerful, and vengeful, neighbour.

New Delhi’s reluctance to engage the Quetta Shoora also stems from the absence of intelligence mechanisms needed for contacting the Taliban leadership. With Mullah Omar in the ISI’s custody and with other senior leaders scattered in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, a strong Indian intelligence presence around Kandahar would be essential for initiating the engagement. Giving the lie to Pakistan’s conviction that Indian agents in Kandahar are fuelling the entire Baluchistan insurrection, the rather more prosaic truth is that the Indian consulate in Kandahar is so preoccupied with surviving day-to-day that there is little scope for more derring-do tasks like contacting Mullah Omar.

Establishing dialogue with the Quetta Shoora must be recognized as a key strategic requirement. This would allow India to catalyse a favourable settlement in post-2014 Afghanistan, something that would be in the interests of every player involved, and especially the Afghan people. There is a wellspring of trust in Indian goodwill in Afghanistan. New Delhi must also trust in its own influence and ability. 

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

King Kong... The Beauty... cannot be with... king kong... what is the option... put down...

Anonymous said...

Shuklaji,
Plz don't trust the talibans. The taliban hasn't even spared their parents(Pak & US). They have no human value in them.

Anonymous said...

It's one thing to hold a point of view strongly, it is another to accuse people who do not heed you of "short-sightedness, unimaginativeness, incompetence, prejudice and fear".

You have the luxury of being an analyst. MEA/RAW will be the ones dealing with the consequences of making a wrong call.

Anonymous said...

I wonder what happened to the 800 pound gorilla !!!

Broadsword said...

@ Anonymous 16:05, or shall I say the 800 pound Anonymous!

Thank you for being so weight conscious about gorillas ;-)


While I say, "what's a hundred pounds between gorillas?", here are a couple of articles on the subject for you to read:

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-05/features/ct-tribu-words-work-gorilla-20110105_1_gorilla-idiom-elephant

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-dorchen/where-did-100-pounds-of-g_b_97262.html

But thanks for setting demanding standards in English prose. I think it is important.

Broadsword said...

@ Anonymous 15:43

You say, "MEA/RAW will be the ones dealing with the consequences of making a wrong call."

You're kidding us, right? On 26/11, was it the MEA/RAW that was dealing with the consequences of making wrong calls on AfPak?

The consequences will be dealt with by common citizens in India... myself included. The people who will be most sheltered from the consequences will be the MEA and RAW in their government accommodation and lal batti vaali gaariyaan.

By the way, do remind me of one MEA/RAW official who has ever been called to account for a wrong decision! Don't scratch your head... there isn't one.