Monday, 15 January 2018

As Netanyahu arrives, will Spike missile go the Rafale fighter route?

Better missiles like Javelin (above) and MPP are now available, but only Spike has undergone trials

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 15th Jan 18

The defence industry is watching to see if the Indian government will go the same way with the Spike anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) as it did with the Rafale fighter – which is to abandon half-way a competitive global tender and instead conclude a government-to-government contract, for smaller numbers, using the logic of “operational necessity”.

Two weeks before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s five-day visit to India which began on Sunday, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems – the Israeli firm that makes the Spike missile –announced it had “received an official statement from the Indian Ministry of Defense on the cancellation of the Spike missile deal”.

The tender that New Delhi cancelled was for 321 ATGM launchers and 8,356 missiles, worth an estimated $500 million (Rs 3,200 crore). Rafael was required to dicharge offsets worth 30 per cent of that value and to transfer technology to Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) for building an estimated 30,000 more Spike missiles in India.

The tender was cancelled, as revealed by army chief General Bipin Rawat on Friday, because the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) is going to develop and supply an indigenous ATGM. Since the DRDO missile would be manufactured in numbers only by 2021-22, Rawat’s concern is: “How do we bridge the gap between now and 2021-22?”

To do so, the army has recommended buying “lesser numbers” of a foreign ATGM, which could by default be Spike. Rawat says: “Whether it is going to be Spike or somebody else [we don’t know]. But we have tested the Spike; we haven’t tested the other missiles. So if we have to go in for a faster procurement, we may have to go in for a G2G (government-to-government buy). That is the issue being discussed.”

Defence industry experts say, if India restricts itself to Spike in bridging this gap, it will deny itself the opportunity to buy more advanced and capable ATGMs that were unavailable in 2010, when New Delhi issued a global tender. These are: the American FGM-148 Javelin, and the Missile Moyenne Portee (MPP, or “medium range missile”), built by MBDA of France.

The Javelin, produced by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, is a true “fire-and-forget” missile, whose inbuilt seeker locks onto targets up to 4,000 metres away, steering the missile autonomously and allowing an infantryman to quickly take cover after firing the missile. This capability is also referred to as “lock-on-before-launch”.

In contrast, the Spike, which has a range of only 2,500 metres, requires the infantryman to remain exposed for almost 30 seconds, while he guides the flying missile towards the target.

The MPP, like the Javelin, it is a true “fire-and-forget” missile with a range of 4,000 metres.

Furthermore, the Spike trails an optic-fibre cable behind it as it flies towards the target, through which guidance commands are given to the missile. This cable can snag on trees and power lines, disrupting the missile. In contrast, the Javelin and the MPP missiles trail no cable, since the missile is guided by on-board software.

The Javelin and MPP are also superior in their capability for “soft launch”. When a missile is fired, a gas canister propels it forward for the first ten metres, after which its on-board rocket motor ignites. This allows the missile to be launched from closed spaces, like bunkers. In earlier missiles like the Spike, the rocket motor ignites on launch, creating a “back blast” that would destroy a bunker or room from which it is launched.

The army’s motivation is clear: it wants an ATGM without delay, to equip its 350-plus infantry battalions. Senior generals say they would choose the less capable Spike missile now, over years more spent in evaluating the Javelin and the MPP.

When asked if this meant that a sluggish procurement process was denying the army state-of-the-art and potentially cheaper weapons systems, the general nodded agreement.

Netanyahu’s 130-member delegation includes the chief of Rafael Advanced Defence Systems.

Saturday, 13 January 2018

Chinese troops remain in Doklam: Indian Army chief gives authoritative account

The map Beijing released in June. The Torsa Nallah is in green, flowing left to right through Doklam

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 13th Jan 18

In New Delhi on Friday, army chief General Bipin Rawat provided the first authoritative account of a globally watched 73-day confrontation last year when India and China almost came to blows. The face off between several hundred armed soldiers from China and India took place at Doklam – an 89 square kilometre patch of land that is claimed by both China and Bhutan.

The face-off began on June 16, when Indian troops moved in strength into Doklam –territory that it did not own or claim – to block a large team of Chinese construction workers, escorted by troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who began extending a track partly built during previous years. After weeks of tension, the crisis de-escalated on August 28 after tough negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing.

With both governments non-committal, analysts on both sides claimed victory – that they had forced the other side to withdraw. But today, Rawat admitted that Indian troops withdrew to their side of the border, while the PLA remains in Doklam.

Rawat’s verbatim account, with editors’ notes in brackets, is as follows.

“Doklam is an area that is divided into two parts: North Doklam and South Doklam. The Torsa nallah separates the two (green line on map, flowing left to right in Dong Lang, the Chinese name for Doklam). In South Doklam is a ridge called the Jampheri ridge, where the Royal Bhutan Army maintains a seasonal post. This is at the southern extremity of Doklam.

“As far as Northern Doklam is concerned, there are three passes… Through these passes, specifically through a pass called Batang La, the Chinese had been building a road since 2000… a little before. Till June 2016, they had come in quite close to our area and to the Torsa Nala. They would come, build a road and go back.

“But one fine day last year the Chinese came with fairly large amount of equipment, large amount of people, supported by the PLA. Up to June 2016 there was fairly inconspicuous activity – one or two bulldozers that would scrape the earth and go away. But this time we found that the kind of equipment and manpower they came with, they meant business. We felt they would probably try and claim the whole of Doklam and build a road there, and probably reach where the RBA post was [at Jampheri]. That was our impression.

“We realised that if this was going to happen, we would have to block it. This was posing a threat to us and was changing the status quo… and violating our agreement with the Chinese to maintain the status quo. So we were compelled to take action and block them. That led to a stalemate, which continued [for 73 days].”

“[After the negotiated disengagement of August 28] the PLA has occupied Northern Doklam. They are there...

“During the Doklam crisis, let me tell you we had excellent coordination with the government; I daresay between the PMO, the ministry of external affairs (MEA), the ministry of defence and the army.

“The issue was that we had actually stepped into territory that wasn’t ours. And when you step into a territory which is not yours, the MEA comes in. It is not that you have stepped into your territory, but into territory which either belonged to China or to Bhutan. It didn’t belong to us.

“So hereinafter, what happened is that the China have stayed put in that area… The disengagement said that we should not have a face-to-face confrontation, because here we were face-to-face. We said we should separate out. That separation has taken place.

“We have come back from where we had stepped in, [and returned] to our own territory. We are now on the watershed. And the Chinese too have gone back that much distance. But behind that, they have continued to maintain themselves.

“When this [Doklam] escalation took place, we saw a large number of [Chinese] troops in other areas of Tibet, including some guns and some tanks and other equipment. But let me tell you that we have seen that complete equipment almost gone. But as far as the North Doklam area is concerned… the Chinese are there.

“But there too, thinning out has happened. We had worked out in the disengagement that we would keep the separation between us. But even behind that, while there are a large number of tents in that area, a large amount of troops have gone back from that area. We are not seeing the kind of activity that we were seeing in that area in the month of June, July and August.

“The tents remain. He (the Chinese) had constructed some toilets and those toilets remain. He had created some observation posts… and those structures remain. But we are seeing a reduction in manpower.

“As of now, we feel the de-escalation has happened because of the winter months, maybe; or because he felt it was time to de-escalate. But because the structures are still there – he has a lot of temporary structures – there is a possibility of movement again taking place once the winter months get over.

“Should he come in again, we will again take a call on what has to be done. But let me tell you diplomatic efforts are on to de-escalate everything and see that everything returns to normalcy.

“More important now is the engagement between Bhutan and China, and how they resolve the issue. There are border demarcation talks also happening between Bhutan and China. How they progress, we will have to wait and watch.”

Friday, 12 January 2018

New US ambassador proposes Indo-American helicopters, unmanned combat vehicles

Juster wants US-India tri-service exercises, like India's Exercise Indra with Russia

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 12th Jan 18

Kenneth Juster, America’s recently arrived ambassador to India, has identified defence and counter-terrorism as a “key pillar” of Indo-US cooperation.

Making his first public speech in New Delhi on Thursday, Juster noted that “In little more than a decade, US defence trade with India has expanded from virtually nothing to over 15 billion dollars and includes sales of some of America’s most advanced military equipment.”

Juster outlined a US wish list for the next wave of arms sales to India, naming “fighter aircraft production; and the co-development of next generation systems, including a Future Vertical Lift platform or Advanced Technology Ground Combat Vehicles.”

Washington officials have been backing an offer by Lockheed Martin to manufacture the F-16 Block 70 fighter in India, and Boeing’s offer to build its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter for the Indian Navy. However, this is the first time a senior US official has publicly mentioned a proposal to co-develop a range of combat helicopters (Future Vertical Lift platform) or unmanned ground vehicles (Advanced Technology Ground Combat Vehicle). So far, these have been discussed only within the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), a high-level US-India joint forum for overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and exploring new initiatives.

Senior Indian military officials, speaking off-the-record, say an Indo-US helicopter or an autonomous combat vehicle would provide a major impetus to the relationship.

Juster, who has worked since 2000 on the US-India relationship, is keenly aware of the potential for enhancing trust through co-development projects. He stated: “I want to emphasize that the United States is more than just another [arms] supplier… We seek to assist India’s efforts to build up its indigenous defence base and capabilities, as well as enhance the inter-operability of our two forces as major defence partners in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Pointing out that the two countries already conduct robust single-service exercises together, the US ambassador suggested: “it is time to consider a multi-service exercise, perhaps focused on humanitarian aid and disaster relief… [in order to] increase our comfort, ease and confidence in working together.”

The only country with which India conducts a tri-service exercises is Russia. In October, the Indian army, navy and air force sent troops to Vladivostok to take part in the tri-service Exercise Indra 2017 alongside the Russian military.

Juster also sought increased military-to-military exchanges between the two countries to build operational familiarity. “Over time, we should expand officer exchanges at our war colleges and our training facilities, and even at some point post reciprocal military liaison officers at our respective combatant commands.”

Behind the scenes, Washington has been encouraging New Delhi to station a senior military official in each of the two US combatant commands whose responsibilities cover South Asia: the US Pacific Command (PACOM) headquartered in Hawaii, and Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida.

Juster outlined a vision of US-India ties that rest on five pillars: defence and counter-terrorism; economic and cultural relations; energy and the environment; science, technology and health; and regional cooperation, including on Afghanistan.

Underlining Washington’s changed approach to Afghanistan, and its growing disenchantment with Pakistan, Juster pointed out that India and the US “both have a strong interest in promoting peace, security and prosperity… [by] supporting Afghanistan’s National Unity Government and helping build that country’s democratic institutions. 

Wednesday, 10 January 2018

Reuters: US embassy officials to act as “sales force” for defence equipment

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 11th Jan 18

American defence partners like India that Washington likes to woo with access to high-tech weaponry may now find themselves on the same page as lesser partners like Pakistan, to which the US government has tended of late to deny high-end defence equipment.

According to news agency Reuters, President Donald Trump’s administration is finalizing a new strategy for arms sales involving a “whole of government” effort – roping in military and diplomatic personnel posted in US embassies – to push sales of American weaponry in the countries where they are posted.

Reuters says this “key policy change would call for embassy staffers around the world to act essentially as a sales force for defense (sic) contractors, actively advocating on their behalf.”

The new policy could be launched as early as February, senior US officials told Reuters.

Historically, Washington has viewed arms transfers strategically, factoring in aspects like regional power balances and human rights records of the buyer country. Now, Washington’s decision-making will be guided mainly by economic and commercial factors, especially Trump’s key platform of job creation in America.

Reuters reports the Trump administration will also loosen longstanding export control regimes, to facilitate the sale of defence equipment. Since 1976, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) has placed tight restrictions on the export of US weaponry, requiring each sale or arms transfer to be carefully reviewed, and the US Congress to be informed of each sale.

The new policy is unlikely to lead to any changes in arms control transfers to countries that Washington views as adversaries, such as China, Russia or Iran. However, it is less clear how the Trump administration would approach arms sales to countries like Pakistan.

Over the last decade, Washington has made it clear it would not provide Pakistan with weaponry of the technology level that it is prepared to provide India, such as the F-16 Block 70. It remains to be seen how, in a more liberal weapons transfer regime, Washington will handle Pakistan’s inevitable insistence that it be provided technology that matches that sold to India.

While US officials worldwide have traditionally adopted a somewhat hands-off approach towards commercial defence sales, there has also been substantial involvement by the Pentagon in contracts concluded under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. In FMS contracts, such as India’s purchase of the C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, New Delhi signed a contract directly with the Pentagon. The Pentagon then negotiated terms with the equipment manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.

While the White House and the Pentagon declined to comment, Reuters quotes an unnamed US State Department official as stating that the new approach “gives our partners a greater capacity to help share the burden of international security, benefits the defense industrial base and will provide more good jobs for American workers.”

This move would be enthusiastically welcomed by US defence firms, who already constitute seven out of the world’s ten largest defence corporations. Currently, exports constitute 15-25 per cent of the turnover of US defence giants like Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Trump’s new push could provide exports with a larger share.

Tuesday, 9 January 2018

Keep it simple

The 30-year-old INS Kozhikode, one of the Indian Navy's four remaining minesweepers

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 9th Jan 18

The defence ministry has scrapped a 13-year-long procurement process for 12 minesweepers, warships that are critically needed to counter hostile navies’ strategy of bottling up Indian Navy warships in harbour, by laying explosive mines at the exits. For years, the navy has made do with six Soviet-era minesweepers, of which two retired last year and the remainder are outdated. This leaves a glaring hole in our maritime security until a new vendor is identified, a contract concluded and the minesweepers built. Going by past track record, this could take over a decade. This is hardly the first time an operationally vital procurement has been cancelled after years of evaluation. The cancellation of the tender for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), and its culmination in the unplanned procurement of 36 Rafale fighters in flyaway condition, too, embarrassed the Indian procurement process.

Similarly, last month, after years of trials, the defence ministry cancelled the procurement of Spike anti-tank missiles from Israeli company, Rafael. Also last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi commissioned the first Scorpene submarine, INS Kalvari, with great fanfare, but without matching torpedoes – its primary weapon – because of the cancellation of a contract with Italian company WASS for Black Shark torpedoes after its sister firm, helicopter maker AgustaWestland, was investigated in Italy for bribing Indian officials. That also caused the scuppering of a contract for eight AW-101 helicopters for Indian VVIPs. The truth is Indian defence procurement is littered with tens of such cancelled acquisitions and include light utility helicopters, assault rifles and light machine guns for the infantry, naval multi-role helicopters for Indian warships, aerial refuelling aircraft to extend the range of air force fighters, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles (QR-SAMs) to defend against enemy fighter aircraft and many more.

The obvious question that comes to mind is: why do so many procurements fail? The reasons vary: but a prime culprit is the flawed framing of qualitative requirements (QRs) or the performance criteria the weapon being bought must meet. Too often, the user service – the army, navy or air force – motivated by the certainty that sluggish procurement processes will ensure the system enters service at least a decade later when technologies would have advanced, frames such technologically ambitious QRs that no existing system, or perhaps a single existing system, meets those requirements. Since bureaucrats desire at least two eligible contenders for “price discovery”, this sends the acquisition back to the start line.

Other reasons include having unrealistic demands for high-technology that vendors are unprepared to part with; or, as in the MMRCA case, by stipulating such a complex “life cycle costing” model for comparing bids that determining a winner became impossible. Simplification of the procurement process has been repeatedly promised in the past Yet, on the ground the procurement remains every bit as cumbersome as ever. What remains elusive is a simple procurement procedure and bureaucrats who know their subject and do not constantly fear the possibility of subsequent investigation.

Sunday, 7 January 2018

Thirteen links that tell the full story of the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II

The Times of India reports that the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) proposed follow-on contract for 38 additional Pilatus PC-7 Mark II basic trainers for Rs 1,450 crore has been put on hold due to graft allegations. The IAF’s proposed purchase of 38 Pilatus basic trainers from the Swiss company envisions exercising a 50 per cent options clause in the May 2012 contract for 75 Swiss Pilatus PC-7 basic trainers for Rs 2,896 crore.

Since 2013, I have reported almost single-handedly on the IAF’s motivated campaign to buy the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 Mark II, rather than supporting Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd’s (HAL’s) project to design and develop an indigenous basic trainer – the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40), which is currently at an advanced stage of development.

Whether there was mala fide intent on the part of IAF officials, I leave to your judgment. A close reading of my articles should leave you with little doubt about who the key crooks in this game were. As with so many crooked deals, this one too played out in both Congress and BJP days.

For journalists, criminal investigators and concerned citizens who might like to know more about how this played out, I am placing before you 13 links -- chronologically ordered -- to articles that I wrote on this subject for the Business Standard. All these articles are posted here on Broadsword. Please feel free to use my work as you deem fit.


29th July 2013, Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer,

30th July 2013, Air Force diluted at least twelve benchmarks for trainer aircraft, allowing Pilatus into the contract,

31st July 2013, Admissions, obfuscations in Indian Air Force explanation on Business Standard reports,

1st Sept 2013, Air Force to discuss with HAL indigenous trainer road map,

14th Oct 2013, IAF to HAL: build Swiss trainer aircraft, don’t develop your own,

26th March 2014, Air force resists Antony’s order for indigenous trainer aircraft,

21st Nov 2014, Pilatus or HAL’s trainer: Parrikar’s first “Make” decision,

30th Nov 2014, Purchase of Pilatus trainer aircraft deferred, future in limbo,

7th Jan 2015, Scuttling a “Made in India” project: the case of the HTT-40 trainer,

14th Feb 2015, Defence ministry official questions whether Pilatus was cheapest trainer,

2nd March 2015, “Make in India” for HAL trainer, import of Swiss trainer capped,

17th June 2016, Boost for “Made in India”, HAL demonstrates new trainer aircraft to Parrikar,

13th Dec 2017, Aerospace industry eyes business worth Rs 12,500 crore,

Tuesday, 2 January 2018

High on bombast, low on capability

Pakistan has worked with limited resources to maximise its defence. On the Indian side, there's mostly bluster

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 2nd Jan 2018

Last month in Islamabad, Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai outlined a new Pakistani approach to defence strategy. Kidwai is someone worth listening to carefully, being uniquely qualified across the spectrum of Pakistani security and a trusted establishment spokesperson. An artillery officer with deep roots in conventional warfare planning, Kidwai saw battle in Bangladesh in 1971, ending up in an Indian prisoner-of-war camp. As a lieutenant general, Kidwai moved in 2000 into the realm of nuclear planning when he was appointed to head Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD). During an unprecedented 15 years in SPD, Kidwai masterminded Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine of “full spectrum deterrence”. This included the deployment of “tactical nuclear weapons” (TNWs) – short-range, low-yield nuclear bombs that cause lesser damage, creating the illusion of “usability”. TNWs are meant to deter Indian retaliation against any major terrorist provocation from Pakistan, which would involve lightning Indian armoured attacks on multiple fronts to quickly overwhelm Pakistan’s smaller military. In deploying TNWs, Pakistan is following the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which planned to use TNWs in the 1950s and 1960s to avoid being overwhelmed by massive Soviet Union armoured offensives into Western Europe.

Pakistan has deployed Kidwai’s measured articulation on two occasions to rationalise Pakistan’s controversial TNW policy. In March 2015, at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington DC, Kidwai explained that TNWs were meant for “reinforcing deterrence, preventing war in South Asia [and] ensuring peace…” Naturally, he did not mention that this wish for peace was not so much for Indo-Pakistan relations to flower, but rather to provide Pakistan the leeway to pursue “sub-conventional operations” – the use of terrorist and armed militants in cross-border operations against India – without fearing military retaliation. Kidwai also dismissed as “bluster”, India’s doctrinal promise that any attack on Indian forces with weapons of mass destruction (including TNWs) would invoke “massive retaliation”. This is not described, but is assumed to mean the use of heavy nuclear weapons against Pakistani cities, killing tens of millions. Kidwai pointed out this would inevitably evoke a matching response by Pakistan against Indian targets, given the rough parity between the two nuclear arsenals (credible recent assessments say Pakistan’s arsenal is larger) and that numerous Pakistani nukes would survive Indian retaliatory strikes, howsoever massive.

Now Kidwai has been fielded again, this time as Advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which controls Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, to signal a new, less apologetic, international policy. Speaking at a seminar in Islamabad, Kidwai outlined a two-point argument. First, he said India had realised that conventional war was no longer possible, due to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities – meaning TNWs for war-fighting, with the main arsenal deterring Indian retaliation. Second, without the option of conventional military force, India was now developing sub-conventional capabilities (read terrorist proxies). Said Kidwai: “Because of mutually assured destruction, there is unlikelihood (sic) of a hot war or conventional war and therefore the conflict has shifted towards sub-conventional level.” In essence, this involved a “cold war era for regional supremacy… [through the] creation of proxies.” Essentially, Kidwai dragged India down to Pakistan’s level, justifying Pakistan’s support for cross-border terror with his postulation that this was now the new cold war with India.

Pakistan’s allegations of “Indian terrorism” are rich in irony and could have been convincingly dismissed, coming from a government that has long used terrorism and armed militancy as instruments of state policy. India has dismissed such allegations in the past when Islamabad accused New Delhi of backing separatists in Balochistan, and destabilising its Pakhtoon (Pashtun) border belts from its consulates in Afghanistan. But this time Kidwai could point to “public pronouncements by Indian [political] leadership of using terrorism to destabilise Pakistan”. This reference was to Manohar Parrikar who, while serving as defence minister on May 22, 2015, told a gathering in New Delhi (to loud applause): “We have to use terrorists to neutralise terrorists”.

Pakistan has been presented the chance to take advantage of India’s jingoistic security narrative, in which political leaders regard the military as a handy prop for nationalistic grandstanding. In this, reality is second to posturing before the domestic audience. Much was made of the “surgical strikes” of September 2016, but figures tabled in Parliament hardly suggest that Pakistan has been taught a lesson. Ceasefire violations almost doubled in 2017, rising from 405 in 2015; and 449 in 2016, to well over 800 this year. Pakistani firing killed 10 Indian soldiers (including from the Border Security Force) in 2015; and 13 died in 2016, but India lost more than 30 soldiers on the border in 2017. Armed militants took a beating in encounters in the Valley in 2017, but the number of soldiers killed in those encounters also rose. An alert media and strategic community should be parsing these figures, but is not discharging its duty.

Nor is there much searching examination of India’s defence readiness. The army does without basic infantry weapons and soldiers fight without ballistic helmets, bulletproof jackets or fire- and water-retardant clothing. The army remains desperately short of artillery guns, air defence protection, tactical battlefield drones and high-mobility logistics vehicles. The navy commissions warships without sonars and anti-submarine helicopters. Last month, the prime minister presided over a farce while commissioning a new submarine that lacks critical combat capabilities – the Scorpene shares a tiny stock of 64 two-decade-old torpedoes with four old Shishumar-class submarines. The air force remains short of fighters; and the ones it has deliver such low serviceability rates that the 2016 contract for 36 Rafale fighters had to include a $350-million clause binding the vendor, Dassault, to deliver a serviceability rate of 75 per cent for five years – a rate that modern fighters, incorporating modular engineering and built-in test equipment should achieve as a matter of course.

Pakistan’s security establishment, despite its appallingly immoral approach to conflict, has worked with limited resources and money to maximise its national defence – integrating nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional resources to continue bleeding an apparently hapless India. Officials like Khalid Kidwai can stand before an international forum and detail a strategy for Pakistan to achieve its security interests.

In contrast, India’s approach to defence is best summed up by this simple fact: Over the preceding year, three separate defence ministers have occupied that hallowed corner office in South Block. Not one of them would be able to lucidly explain India’s defence strategy and how our military would fight the two-front war we claim to be ready for. Asked how we would match India’s expansive defence allocations with the shopping list of badly needed weaponry, not one would have a coherent answer. Will this change in 2018? Probably not.